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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of the issue of law certified by the United States
District Court for the District of Utah pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3102(1) (2008 RepL).
ISSUE
Judge Dale A. Kimball of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah certified the following issue of law to this Court:
Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an action for the wrongful
death of an unborn child?
RELEVANT STATUTE
Utah's wrongful death statute in effect in 2006, when the relevant events
occurred, provided as follows:
Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2, Workers' Compensation
Act, a parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or
injury of a minor child when the injury or death is caused by the
wrongful act or neglect of another. Any civil action may be
maintained against the person causing the injury or death or, if the
person is employed by another person who is responsible for that
person's conduct, also against the employer. If a parent, stepparent,
adoptive parent, or legal guardian is the alleged defendant in an
action for the death or injury of a child, a guardian ad litem may be
appointed for the injured child or a child other than the deceased child
according to the procedures outlined in Section 78-7-9.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-11-6 (Supp. 2006).

l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and Amelia Sanchez sued the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. First Amended Complaint (Doc. 2, Case No.
2:07cv00291, U.S. District Court, District of Utah) Tj 4. Plaintiffs alleged that
their son was stillborn as a result of negligent prenatal care rendered at the
Mountainlands Community Health Center in Provo, Utah. Id,ffif26-27. Plaintiffs
based their claim for damages on Utah's wrongful death statute. Id, % 28.
The United States filed a Motion in Limine to Exclude from Trial All
Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and Amelia Sanchez's Damages
for Wrongful Death, in which the United States argued that Utah's wrongful death
statute does not permit recovery of damages arising from the death of an unborn
child. Docs. 21, 22, 25. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum opposing the United
States' motion. Doc. 23. In addition, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Certification of
Issue to Utah Supreme Court, which the United States opposed. Docs. 26-29.
Judge Dale A. Kimball of the United States District Court issued a Memorandum
Decision and Order Certifying Question to Utah Supreme Court. Doc. 31
(addendum at A-1).

2

Factual Background
Plaintiff Amelia Sanchez received prenatal care at the Mountainlands
Community Health Center between December 28, 2005, and April 19, 2006.
Memorandum Decision at 2. On April 19, 2006, Mrs. Sanchez went to the Labor
and Delivery Department at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center because she
was experiencing contractions. Id; First Amended Complaint f 22. An
examination revealed no fetal heartbeat, and it was determined that the fetus had
expired. Id Mrs. Sanchez gave birth to a stillborn male on April 20, 2006.
Memorandum Decision at 2; First Amended Complaint % 24.
The parties disagree as to the cause of the fetal demise. Plaintiffs argue that
Mrs. Sanchez's labor should have been induced earlier than April 19, 2006, and
that the baby would have been bom alive if labor had been induced earlier.
Memorandum Decision at 2. The United States contends that the medical standard
of care did not require earlier induction of labor and that the fetus expired due to
an unavoidable "nuchal cord event" (wrapping of the umbilical cord around the
fetus's neck). Memorandum Decision at 2-3; see also First Amended Complaint

124.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah's wrongful death statute created a cause of action that did not exist
under the common law. Beginning in the late 1800s, the wrongful death statute
provided that a parent or guardian could sue for the wrongful death of a "minor
child." The plain language of the statute permits a cause of action only for the
death of a child who has been bom, not for an unborn child. This interpretation of
the statute is supported by the Utah Legislature's use of the terms "unborn child"
or "unborn individual" when it intends to include an unborn child in a statute's
coverage. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that the Legislature
has not amended the statute to include unborn children despite the fact that this
Court has twice rejected claims for the wrongful deaths of unborn children.

4

ARGUMENT
I.

Legal Framework
A.

Federal Tort Claims Act

The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTC A") is a limited waiver of the United
States' sovereign immunity. U.S. v. Orleans. 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976). Under the
FTCA, the United States is liable in tort claims to the same extent that a private
person would be liable under the law of the state where the alleged tortious
activity occurred. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (2006); Franklin v. United States.
992 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993). Employees of federally supported
community health centers, such as the Mountainlands Community Health Center,
are deemed to be employees of the United States for purposes of liability under the
FTCA. 42 U.S.C. § 233(a), (g) (2006). Thus, the liability of the United States in
the present case is defined by Utah law governing wrongful death claims.
B.

Utah's Wrongful Death Statute

Since the common law recognized no claim for wrongful death, Plaintiffs'
claim derives solely from the wrongful death statute. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hospital, Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179, 1183 (Utah 1983). Utah's wrongful death statute,
like those of most other states, was patterned after Lord Campbell's Act, which
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was enacted in England in 1846. Id Utah's first wrongful death statute was
enacted by the Territorial Legislature in 1874. Id at 1184.
Beginning no later than 1898, Utah's wrongful death statute provided that a
parent could sue for the wrongful death of a "minor child." See Utah Rev. Stat. §
2911 (1898) (addendum at A-18). The Legislature amended the statute numerous
times thereafter, but retained the term "minor child." See Compiler's Notes, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-11-6 (1977 Repl.) [hereinafter "1977 Compiler's Notes"]
(addendum at A-20). The statute did not define "minor child."
In 2009, the Utah Legislature amended the wrongful death statute in House
Bill 329, which "provides that wrongful death claims of children will be handled
in the same manner as the wrongful death claims of adults." See H.B. 329, Utah
Code, 2009 Advance Legislative Service, ch. 79 (amending Utah Code sections
78B-3-102 and -106) (addendum at A-22). The legislation consolidated wrongful
death claims for both children and adults into a single section that provides for a
claim "when the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of
another." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-106(l) (Supp. 2009).
C.

Statutory Construction

The question before the Court requires an analysis of what the Legislature
intended when it created a cause of action for the wrongful death of a "minor
6

child." "When interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute's plain language
with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent." Martinez v.
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, % 46, 164 P.3d 384. The Court will "give
effect to the plain language unless the language is ambiguous," Blackner v. State
Dep't of Transportation, 2002 UT 44, If 12, 48 P.3d 949, or "unless such a reading
is unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant contravention of the express
purpose of the statute," Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292
(Utah 1996). The Court "'presume[s] that the legislature used each word
advisedly [and reads] each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.'"
Martinez, 2007 UT 42, ^ 46 (citation omitted). Moreover, "[statutes should be
read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related
provisions and statutes." IcL When the statutory language is clear, the Court will
"refuse to consider public policy arguments or otherwise attempt to assess the
wisdom of the legislation." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518,
522 (Utah 1997).
II.

The plain language of Utah's wrongful death statute does not create a
cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
The definition of "child" includes both the living and the unborn. See, e.g.,

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 388 (2002) ("la: an unborn or
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recently bom human being: fetus, infant, baby . . . 2a: a young person of either sex
esp. between infancy and youth

"); Random House Webster's College

Dictionary 229 (2d ed. 1999) ("La person between birth and full growth; a young
boy or girl. 2. a son or daughter. 3. a baby or infant. 4. a human fetus....");
Black's Law Dictionary 254 (8th ed. 2004) ("La person under the age of majority.
. . . 3. A boy or girl; a young person. 4. A son or daughter. . . . 5. A baby or fetus..
.."). However, the Utah Legislature did not establish a cause of action for the
wrongful death of a "child," but rather for a "minor child." A "minor" child is one
"having the status of a legal minor not having reached the age of majority or full
legal age . . . . " Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1439; see also
Random House Webster's College Dictionary 843 ("a person under full legal
age"); Black's Law Dictionary 1017 ("A person who has not reached full legal
age; a child or juvenile."). "The period of minority extends in males and females
to the age of eighteen years

" UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (2009 RepL).

Thus, a "minor" child is defined by the child's age. Age is measured with
reference to the date of live birth, not the date of conception or fetal viability.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 40 ("age" is "the length of time
during which a being or thing has lived or existed: the length of life or existence
from birth or beginning to the time spoken of or referred to . . . . " ) ; Random House
8

Webster's College Dictionary 24 ("age" is "a period of human life, measured by
years from birth . . . . " ) . See also Fuenmayor v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 2d
1222, 1224 (D. Utah 2009) ("Based on the plain language of the [Utah wrongful
death] statute, presuming that the legislature used each word deliberately and
purposively, the term 'minor child' does not encompass unborn children, and
therefore appears to preclude wrongful death claims based on the death of unborn
children."); Alternative Options and Services for Children v. Chapman, 2004 UT
App 488, If 34 n.8, 106 P.3d 744 (noting that the definition of "child" in UTAH
CODE ANN. § 62A-4a-701 "does not specifically include unborn children.
Moreover, children in utero are not customarily referred to as minors . . . . "
(emphasis added)); Alma Evans Trucking v. Roach. 714 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Utah
1986) (holding that worker's compensation death benefits were not payable prior
to the birth of a posthumous child: "We believe that the legislature used the word
'child' in its ordinary and usual sense, viz., a child which has been born.... Until
the child is born, it is usually referred to as a child in utero or a fetus. While the
legislature had the power to award benefits to a child in utero, it clearly did not do
so.").
The wrongful death statute establishes a cause of action only for the
wrongful death of a "minor child." This is an unambiguous reference to a child
9

born alive, who has achieved an age between birth and the age of majority. Since
the plain language of the statute does not include an unborn child, Utah law does
not permit a claim arising from the death of a fetus.
III.

When the Utah Legislature intends that a statute cover an unborn child,
it includes "unborn" in the statutory language.
The Legislature uses the modifier "unborn" when it intends to include an

unborn child in statutory provisions. In the Probate Code, for example, "a parent
may represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a conservator or
guardian for the child has not been appointed." UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-303(6)
(Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). "Unless otherwise represented, a minor.
incapacitated, or unborn individual... may be represented by and bound by
another

"

UTAH

CODE ANN. § 75-7-304 (Supp. 2009) (emphasis added). The

Legislature used similarly explicit language in the Criminal Code: "A person
commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with
criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute
defining the offense, causes the death of another human being, including an
unborn child at any stage of its development." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-20 l(l)(a)
(2008 Repl.) (emphasis added). The Legislature also distinguished between
"children" and an "unborn child" in the Cohabitant Abuse Act: "'Cohabitant'
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means an emancipated person pursuant to Section 15-2-1 or a person who is 16
years of age or older who: . . . (d) has one or more children in common with the
other party; [or] (e) is the biological parent of the other party's unborn child:... ."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-102(2) (2008 Repl.) (emphasis added).
Thus, when the Utah Legislature intends that a statute cover both living and
unborn children, it does so by referring to an "unborn child" or "unborn
individual." This corroborates the conclusion that "minor child" in the wrongful
death statute refers only to a child who has been bom alive, not an unborn fetus.
See Fuenmayor. 626 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 ("[T]he Utah legislature has
demonstrated a consistent practice of distinguishing between a 'minor child' and
an 'unborn child.' [footnote omitted] In light of these considerations, the
legislature's use of the term 'minor child' unambiguously refers to children born
alive . . . . " ) .
IV.

The Legislature also demonstrated its intent by retaining the term
"minor child" in the wrongful death statute even after this Court had
rejected claims based on the alleged wrongful deaths of unborn
children.
As discussed above, Utah's wrongful death statute created a cause of action

arising from the death of a "minor child" beginning in the late 1800s. This Court
first addressed the availability of a claim for the death of a fetus in 1942. In Webb
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v. Snow. 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942), the plaintiff alleged that she suffered both
personal injuries and a miscarriage as a result of an assault and battery. The jury
rendered a verdict in the plaintiffs favor and awarded her the full amount of
damages she claimed. Id at 116. On appeal, the defendants asserted several
errors, including the trial court's instruction that the jury could award damages not
only for the plaintiffs own injuries but also "for the loss of her unborn child as a
result of said miscarriage." Id. at 118. This Court agreed that the challenged
instruction was improper:
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are actionable, and
compensation may be awarded for the physical and mental sufferings
experienced by a woman who has a miscarriage by reason of injuries
caused by the wrongful acts of others, damages are not awarded for
"loss of the unborn child" itself. There is no basis for the part of the
instruction given by the court.
Id at 119 (emphasis added; citations omitted).
One year after the Webb decision, the Utah Legislature amended the
wrongful death statute but continued to use the term "minor child." See 1977
Compiler's Notes (addendum at A-20). The Legislature again amended the statute
in 1951, and again retained the term "minor child." Id This is significant because
legislators are presumed to enact legislation with knowledge of prior judicial
interpretations of the law. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97
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(1979); Greenhalgh v. Pavson City. 530 P.2d 799, 800-01 (Utah 1975). Thus, the
Utah Legislature is presumed to have been aware of the Webb decision when it
amended the wrongful death statute, yet the Legislature retained the term "minor
child" in each amendment.
The Court next addressed the issue in 1975. In Nelson v. Peterson, 542
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death of
her full-term fetus, which she claimed was stillborn due to the defendants'
negligence in managing her labor. The plaintiff appealed from an adverse jury
verdict and argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred in refusing to
permit her to proceed at trial with her wrongful death claim. This Court affirmed
the verdict: "The third assignment of error is without merit and was decided to be
so in the case of Webb v. Snow." WL at 1077. The Court quoted the statement
from Webb that "damages are not awardedfor 'loss of the unborn child' itself"
Id. (alteration in original). Two years after the Nelson decision, the Legislature
again amended the wrongful death statute and retained the term "minor child."
See 1977 Compiler's Notes.
Since the Legislature is presumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of
statutes, its retention of the term "minor child" in numerous amendments that were

13

enacted after this Court's decisions reflects an intent not to include in the wrongful
death statute a claim based on the death of an unborn child.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the United States requests that the Court
answer the question of law certified by the United States District Court as follows:
Utah's wrongful death statute does not create a cause of action for the
wrongful death of an unborn child.
DATED this 4th day of January, 2010.
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN
Acting United States Attorney

mwmBY^E. NELSON
AMY J. OLIVER
Assistant United States Attorneys
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of the United States Attorney's
Office and that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF
OF THE UNITED STATES were mailed, postage prepaid, this 4th day of
January, 2010, to the following:

Brett R. Boulton
Kevin J. Sutterfield
Flickinger & Sutterfield, P.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
3000 N. University Ave., #300
Provo, UT 84604
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

MIGUEL CARRANZA and AMELIA
SANCHEZ, natural parents of Jesua M.V.
Carranza-Sanchez, deceased,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER CERTIFYING QUESTION TO
UTAH SUPREME COURT

vs.
Case No. 2:07CV291DAK
UNITED STATES and John and Jane
Does I-X,

Judge Dale A. Kimball

Defendants.

This matter is before the court on two interrelated motions: (1) Defendant United States
of America's Motion in Limine to Exclude From Trial All Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel
Carranza and Amelia Sanchez's Damages for Wrongful Death; and (2) Plaintiffs' Motion to
Certify Question of Law to the Utah Supreme Court. The court held a hearing on the motions on
May 12, 2009. At the hearing, Plaintiffs were represented by Brett R. Boulton and Defendant
was represented by Amy J. Oliver and Jeffrey E. Nelson. After careful consideration of the
parties' memoranda and arguments made at the hearing, as well as the facts and law relevant to
the present motions, the court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order.

BACKGROUND
Between December 28,2005, and April 19,2006, Plaintiff Amelia Sanchez received
prenatal care at the Mountainlands Community Health Center in Provo, Utah. Mountainlands
and its contracted physicians and employees are deemed to be employees of the United States
government by the Health Resources and Services Administration and Bureau of Primary Health
Care, in accordance with Section 224(g) of the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 233(g) as
amended by the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1995 (P.L. 104-73), for
purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
On April 19,2006, Sanchez went to the Labor and Delivery Department at Utah Valley
Regional Medical Center where it was determined that the fetus exhibited no movement or
heartbeat. Sanchez's labor was induced, and she gave birth to a stillborn male on April 20, 2006.
Factually, the parties dispute whether medical negligence occurred in this case. Plaintiffs
argue diat the fetus died because he was post mature, meaning that the baby was alive up to and
beyond the time that he reached full term. Plaintiffs allege that medical professionals at
Mountainlands breached the applicable standards of care by not monitoring her condition more
closely in her final weeks of pregnancy and not inducing labor at her doctor's visit on April 14,
2006. At that visit, Sanchez had lost her mucous plug and informed her doctor that she was
experiencing vaginal bleeding and erratic contractions. Her doctor, however, did not induce her.
The United States' expert witness, Dr. Later, states that "the cause of stillborn was a
nuchal cord event, which unfortunately is unavoidable." Dr. Later states that the loss of a
mucous plug and irregular contractions are common several days before delivery and are not an
indication to proceed with an immediate induction. The expert's report notes that Sanchez called
2

Mountainlands three days after her doctor's visit, on April 17, 2006, complaining of contractions
and discharge. She was told to go to Labor & Delivery, but she did not go until April 19, 2009.
Dr. Later opines that even had she gone to the hospital on April 17, findings may have been
normal and the cord accident may have still occurred later as it did. He states that cord accidents
are not age-related and cannot be predicted.
Plaintiffs present action against the United States is brought pursuant to the FTCA. See
28 U.S.C. § 1346 et seq. The FTCA authorizes actions against the United States for damages
caused by the negligence of government employees under circumstances where a private person
would be liable under state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The United States is liable to the same
extent as a private individual in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).
On October 12, 2006, in accordance with the regulations implementing the FTCA,
Plaintiffs filed the requisite "Standard Form 95-Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death" with the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). The Standard
Form 95 is designed for any type of claim that can be asserted under the FTCA. The Standard
Form 95, therefore, provides boxes or sections for the claimant to state the nature and extent of
the claim. The boxes describing the claims are then followed by boxes allowing the claimant to
identify the amount of damages sought in connection with the claim.
The relevant section provided on the Standard Form 95 for a description of the claim
relevant in this case was pre-printed "personal injury/wrongful death." Under this section,
Plaintiffs stated that the nature and extent of the claim was: "Death of Claimaint's unborn son,
Jesua Miguel Valentin Carranza-Sanchez, as a result of medical malpractice. See Addendum."
3

Plaintiffs attached a four-page Addendum providing a narrative of the nature and extent of their
claim. Plaintiffs' Addendum states: "Notice is hereby given by Amelia Sanchez and Miguel
Carranza... of their intent to commence a medical malpractice action against Mountainlands
Community Health Center" and the healthcare professionals providing Sanchez prenatal care
who were deemed employees of Mountainlands. The Addendum provides a paragraph identified
as "Nature of Claim." Undetthis heading, Plaintiffs state: "Sanchez and Carranza's claim is
based upon the negligent care of the above named health care providers and health care facility
and those who may have assisted them in treating Sanchez and her unborn child." The
Addendum then gives a factual description of Sanchez's medical conditions, prenatal care, and
delivery. Plaintiffs state that because there was a nuchal cord entanglement, which consisted of
the cord wrapping one time around the baby's throat, the doctor told Plaintiffs' that an autopsy
would not be necessary. Pathology examined the baby and the placenta and observed no fetal
anomalies.
Plaintiffs' Addendum concludes with a paragraph entitled "Nature of Injuries and
Damages." Under this heading, Plaintiffs state that as a result of the medical negligence,
"Plaintiffs, as parents of the deceased, have suffered the injuries described above, including
funeral expenses and general damages of pain and suffering, loss of affection, loss of
companionship, and loss of happiness of association."
Under the section for "Amount of Claim" on the Standard Form 95, the form provides
boxes for "property damage," "personal injury," "wrongful death," and a "total amount." In this
damages section, Plaintiffs identified $1,000,000 of damages in the "wrongful death" box, and
$ 1,000,000 in the "total amount" box. Plaintiffs did not list any damages under "personal
4

injury."
After Plaintiffs submitted their Standard Form 95, the claim was deemed denied because
six months passed without a formal denial by HHS. The denial of their claim allowed Plaintiffs
to bring their action in this court. Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint alleges only one cause of
action entitled medical negligence. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants failed "to reasonably and
adequately provide medical care to Plaintiff Sanchez during her pregnancy." First Am. Compl. f
26. Although the claim is styled as a medical negligence claim, many of the allegations and
requested damages refer to a wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs allege that
[a]s a direct, proximate, and foreseeable consequence and cause of
the aforementioned negligence, acts, failures to act, refusals to act,
and breaches of duty on the part of Defendants, Plaintiffs, as the
surviving natural parents of the deceased, have personally suffered
and will continue to suffer loss of companionship, loss of
association, loss of advice, loss of counsel, loss of comfort, lost of
happiness of association, and other noneconomic and general
damages for the wrongful death of their child in such amounts as
the Plaintiffs will establish at the trial hereof. Plaintiffs are entitled
to recover all economic and noneconomic damages, together with
such other damages as may be provided under Utah's wrongful
death statute of § 78-11-7 and other applicable law, from the
Defendants.
Id. f 28. Plaintiffs prayer for relief seeks damages against Defendants: "a. for general damages
for Plaintiffs conscious and unconscious pain and suffering from the date of the death of their
child in a reasonable amount;" "b. for general and noneconomic damages for the wrongful death
of their child in a reasonable amount;" and "c. for special damages for medical, funeral, and
burial expenses incurred as a result of injuries to and the wrongful death of their child as
proven."

5

ANALYSIS
Defendant's motion in limine asks this court to preclude Plaintiffs from testifying as to
any alleged damages of loss of companionship, loss of association, loss of advice, loss of
comfort, loss of happiness of association, and other noneconomic and general damages for the
wrongful death of their unborn child because none of these damages are cognizable under Utah
law. Defendant argues that the court should exclude any evidence related to damages associated
with a wrongful death cause of action because there is no claim of action under Utah law for the
wrongful death of an unborn child.
Plaintiffs, however, contend that this court should recognize a cause of action for the
wrongful death of an unborn child and allow Plaintiffs to testify to the associated damages.
Plaintiffs brought a Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Utah Supreme Court asking this
court to certify the question of whether Utah's wrongful death statute allows a wrongful death
cause of action for an unborn child. Plaintiffs argue that the question presents a controlling issue
of law in this case and there appears to be no controlling Utah law. Plaintiffs ask this court to
stay its ruling on Defendant's motion in limine until the Utah Supreme Court has acted on the
order of certification.
Rule 41(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "the Utah Supreme
Court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it by a court of the United States when
requested to do so by such certifying court... if the state of the law of Utah applicable to a
proceeding before the certifying court is uncertain." Utah R. App. P. 41(a). The certification
order must state the "question of law to be answered," "that the question certified is a controlling
issue of law in a proceeding pending before the certifying court," and "that there appears to be no
6

controlling Utah law." Id. 41(c). Courts have found that certification is appropriate "when the
case concerns a matter of vital public concern, where the issue will likely recur in other cases,
where resolution of the question to be certified is outcome determinative of the case, and where
the state supreme court has yet to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the issue."
State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co. v. Pate, 275 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
As demonstrated by the parties competing motions, both parties in this case seek a
determination of whether Utah law allows a wrongful death action for an unborn child prior to
trial. The court, therefore, must determine whether Utah law is uncertain on the issue of whether
a cause of action exists for the wrongful death of an unborn child.
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "'the right of action to recover damages for
death is not a common-law right, but is one created by statute.'" State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parmley v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 228 P. 557,
560 (Utah 1924)). "The Utah wrongful death act was originally peissed by the Territorial
Legislature in 1874 to remedy the harsh effects of the common law rule which did not recognize
wrongful death actions at all" Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179,1184 (Utah
1983). Under Utah's wrongful death statute, as it existed at the time of the case in question, "a
parent or guardian may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child when the injury
or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another." Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-6 (2006)
amended and renumbered by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-3-102 (2008) (changing language from
"may maintain" to "may bring") (emphasis added).
The dispute between the parties in this case focuses on the meaning of the term "minor
child." The statute does not define the term "minor child." In interpreting a statute, courts "look
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first to the statute's plain language to determine its meaning." H.U.F. v. V.P. W., 203 P.2d 943,
951 (Utah 2009). When determining the meaning of a statute's plain language, "[i]t is presumed
that... the words and phrases were chosen carefully and advisedly." Amax Magnesium Corp, v.
Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990). Defendant argues that the plain language of the
wrongful death statute provides a wrongful death action for only a minor child, not an unborn
child. Plaintiffs, however, assert that a fiill-term unborn child could be considered a minor child
under the statute. There is no provision specifically excluding an unborn childfromthe
definition of minor child.
Defendant contends it is clear that the Utah Legislature did not intend for plaintiffs to
recover damages for the wrongful death of or injury to an unborn child because the legislature
omitted the words "unborn child" from the wrongful death statute. Defendant contrasts this
omission of "unborn child" in the wrongful death statute with legislature's use of the term
"unborn child" in other provisions of the Utah Code. Under Utah's probate code, "a parent may
represent and bind the parent's minor or unborn child if a conservator or guardian for the child
has not been appointed." Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-303(6) (emphasis added). Under Utah Code
Annotated Section 31A-22-627(3)(a)(i), an "emergency medical condition" is defined as "placing
the insured's health or, with respect to a pregnant women, the health of the women or her unborn
child, in serious jeopardy." (Emphasis added.) Also, under Utah's criminal code, a person
commits "criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence,
or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute, causes the death of another human
being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development" Id. § 76-5-201(1) (emphasis
added)).
8

Plaintiffs argue that if the legislature intended to hold individuals criminally responsible
for the death of an unborn child, then it would logically and morally follow that the legislature
also intended to hold individuals civilly responsible when their wrongful actions cause the death
of an unborn child. Plaintiffs contend that while the legislature has at times used the term
"unborn child" to add clarity with respect to who is affected by certain laws, a failure to do so
does not necessarily mean unborn children are not to be protected.
Plaintiffs assert that while there are instances of the term "unborn child" being
specifically used by the legislature in other provisions of the Utah Code, there are also other
provisions of the code demonstrating the legislature's commitment to protecting the rights of
unborn children. Plaintiffs specifically point to the preamble to the criminal code's abortion
provisions, which states that "the state of Utah has a compelling interest in the protection of the
lives of unborn children," and "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature to protect and guarantee to
unborn children their inherent and inalienablerightto life as required by Article I, Sections 1 and
7, Utah Constitution," Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-301.1(2) and (3).
In reviewing a separate, but related, issue under Utah's Wrongful Death statute, the Utah
Supreme Court stated that it did not need to "decide the more general question of whether the
death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for maintaining an action under Section 78-11-6."
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clyde, 920 P.2d 1183, 1187 n.8 (Utah 1996). In Clyde, the
court analyzed whether an unborn child's grandparents had standing to bring a wrongful death
action under the wrongful death statute. Id. at 1185. The Clyde court addressed this issue in the
context of whether the grandparents were entitled to underinsured motorist benefits after the
death of their minor daughter and her unborn child. Id.
9

The Clyde court stated that "[b]ecause the legislature has authorized only the 'parent or
guardian' of a minor child to maintain an action for the child's wrongful death, the Clydes may
not maintain an action unless they qualify as the parents or guardians of [their daughter's] unborn
child." Id. at 1185. The Clydes asserted that because they provided their daughter's, "and
therefore her unborn child's, sole means of support, they stood in loco parentis to the unborn
child and should be treated as de facto parents or guardians under section 78-11-6." Id. The
court concluded that it did not need to look past the plain language of the statute "to conclude
that the Clydes do not qualify as the parents or guardians of [their daughter's] unborn child." Id.
at 1186. The court found the term parent to mean only an immediate parent, not a grandparent.
Id.
The Clyde court also supported its conclusion by reasoning that the legislature's "failure
to expressly include persons standing in loco parentis within the class of potential plaintiffs
under section 78-11-6 appears to have been an intentional rejection" because the legislature had
"used the term 'in loco parentis' in several unrelated statutes." Id. at 1187. The court found "that
the legislature knew how to use the term 'in loco parentis' but chose not to do so in section 78-1-6
and therefore did not intend to allow persons standing in loco parentis to maintain an action for
the wrongful death of a minor." Id. The court concluded its analysis by explaining that '"[t]he
fact that the result in some circumstances may be to unreasonably restrict the class of persons
who can bring a wrongful death action is an argument for amendment of the statute, not for our
ignoring its words.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Most relevant to the present case, the Clyde court then included its footnote stating that
because the Clydes did not have standing to maintain an action for the wrongful death of their
10

unborn grandchild, it did not need to decide whether the death of an unborn child could ever
provide the basis for a wrongful death action. The court's footnote cites to two previous Utah
Supreme court cases. The court cited to Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114, 119 (Utah 1942), in which
the court found that no damages are available for the loss of an unborn child, and the dissent in
Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Utah 1975), criticizing Webb.
Defendant asserts that the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Clyde is consistent with its
position that Utah law does not recognize a wrongful death action for an unborn child. Plaintiffs,
however, assert that the Clyde court's footnote clearly indicated that the question was not settled.
The Clyde court's reasoning is similar to Defendant's reasoning in this case. The plain language
of the statute states only minor child and does not include unborn child. The fact that the
legislature used minor child or unborn child in other statutes and not in the wrongful death statute
indicates that the legislature did not intend to include an action for unborn children under the
wrongful death statute. In addition, the argument for inclusion of unborn children under the
wrongful death statute is an argument for an amendment of the statute, not for broadly
interpreting its words or writing in words that are not present.
The court agrees that the Utah Supreme Court could apply the reasoning of Clyde to the
question at hand. The definition of minor child, however, does not appear to be as plain or clear
as the definition of parent. Also, significantly, the Clyde court chose to address whether the
grandparents had standing to assert the cause of action instead of simply stating that no such
cause of action existed under Utah law. Additionally, the Clyde court's footnote indicates that
the court does not consider the issue settled. The court could have cited to Webb and Nelson for
the proposition that the issue was settled, as Defendant suggests. But, instead, the court cited to
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Webb and Nelson's dissent criticizing Webb.
In Webb v. Snow, 132 P.2d 114 (Utah 1942), in which the plaintiff brought an action for
assault and battery that resulted in a miscarriage, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
While injuries resulting in a miscarriage are
actionable, and compensation may be awarded for
the physical and mental sufferings by a woman who
has a miscarriage by reason of injuries caused by the
wrongful acts of others, damages are not awarded
for "loss of the unborn child" itself.
Mat 119.
In Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075,1076 (Utah 1975), the plaintiff "appealed from an
adverse judgment based in an action for the wrongful death of a full-term fetus together with
damages for pain and suffering allegedly caused by the negligent care of plaintiff in connection
with the delivery of her stillborn baby." Id. at 1076. The Utah Supreme Court found the
plaintiffs appeal of the trial court's refusal to permit recovery for the wrongful death of a fullterm fetus to be without merit as a result of Webb. Id. at 1077. The court found that the plaintiff
could not complain about the trial court's instruction allowing her to be awarded compensation
"for her mental distress even though the death of the fetus was not caused by a battery or by
wilful misconduct." Id. But the court found the question of damages moot because the jury did
not find the defendants negligent. Id. The court, however, stated that "[c]ertainly the death of a
viable fetus should be considered as much a ground for damages as would a miscarriage.
Whether or not it gives a different basis for recovery can be determined when liability has been
found in a proper case." Id. at 1077-78.
The dissent in Nelson found the plaintiffs appeal well taken and criticized the majority
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opinion's reliance on Webb. Id. at 1079 (Maughan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that Webb
was "not applicable for two reasons: First, the operative facts are completely distinguishable;
and we would not do an injustice to stare decisis for the reason that the concept advanced by that
case is no longer a part of the weight of authority in this country." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting).
The dissent further argued that there was "no moral, biological, or legal rationale for sustaining
an outmoded, dry rule laced with the fictions of a bygone era." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting).
The court referred to an Oregon state case where the court "rejected the view that an unborn child
has no judicial existence apart from its mother and cites those cases representing the weight of
authority in this country sustaining the court's opinion." Id. (Maughan, J., dissenting).
That the Clyde court would cite to Webb and the dissent in Nelson while stating that it
need not determine whether the death of a fetus can ever provide the basis for a wrongful death
action convinces this court that the Utah Supreme Court views the issue as unsettled. As
recognized by the dissent in Nelson, Webb is not necessarily controlling of the issue. The Webb
case involved an assault and battery claim, not a wrongful death claim. As a result, the Webb
court does not cite to or refer to the wrongful death statute. And, factually, the Webb case
involved a pregnancy at its very early stages, not a full-term fetus ais in Nelson and the present
case. Nelson's reliance on Webb as binding is, therefore, questionable. And, the Clyde court's
citation to Nelson's dissent calls Nelson's holding into question.
Moreover, unlike this case, the Nelson court was reviewing the issue after a jury had
determined that the defendants were not negligent. In this case, the court must determine
whether evidence of damages relating to a wrongful death action can be presented at trial. The
court agrees with the parties that the issue should be determined prior to trial. While Defendant
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opposes certification of the question to the Utah Supreme Court, it does so only on the grounds
that the question of law is settled. Defendant's motion in limine seeks the issue relating to
wrongful death damages to be determined prior to trial. If the court were to wait to certify the
question until a determination was made as to medical negligence in this case, the court would
potentially be required to hold two trials in the matter. Judicial economy, therefore, supports a
finding that the question should be certified and determined before the parties and court incur the
expenditures of time and money associated with trial.
Because the issue of whether Utah's wrongful death statute allows a wrongful death
action for an unborn child is controlling of the motion in limine pending before the court and the
court finds that there is no controlling Utah law, the court concludes that it is appropriate to
certify the question to the Utah Supreme Court. This is an important issue of public policy and
will likely recur. Moreover, certification of the issue "would further the interest of comity and
federalism by giving the Utah Supreme Court an opportunity to answer it in thefirstinstance
should it elect to do so under Utah R. App. P. 41." See Ohio Cos. Ins. v. Unigardlns. Co., 2009
WL 1160297 at *5 (10th Cir. April 28,2009).
Defendant's motion in limine also raises the issue of whether plaintiffs can assert
damages other than wrongful death damages. Plaintiffs argue that Nelson stands for the
proposition that evidence of the mother's mental anguish or suffering is admissible whether or
not the court finds that the unborn child is covered by Utah's wrongful death statute. 542 P.2d at
1077. Defendants, however, argue that not only can Plaintiffs not recover damages for wrongful
death, they cannot recover any other damages related to a broader claim of medical negligence
because Plaintiffs' Standard Form 95 stated damages only under the wrongful death category, not
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under the personal injury category.
If Plaintiffs had a "general claim for noneconomic damages from the loss of their child"
that was distinct from their "more specific claim for noneconomic damages as provided by
Utah's wrongful death statute," Defendant contends that they were required to indicate on their
Standard Forms 95 a sum for those damages that were not wrongful death damages. "The
[FTCA] requires that each claim and claimant meet the prerequisites for maintaining a suit
against the government

If the claimant fails to provide a sum certain within the claim, the

administrative claim fails to meet the statutory prerequisite to maintaining a suit against the
government, and leaves the district court without jurisdiction to hear the case." See Turner ex
rel Turner v. United States, 514 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation
omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675.
Even though Plaintiffs failed to fill in a specific value for personal injury damages, their
Addendum to Standard Form 95, stated that "as a result of the [doctors'] negligence, Plaintiffs ..
. have suffered the injuries described above, including funeral expenses and general damages of
pain and suffering, loss of affection, loss of companionship, and loss of happiness of association.
Plaintiffs argue that they did not put an amount for personal injury damages because Sanchez did
not suffer any personal injury. Plaintiffs claim that their damages were mental anguish resulting
from the alleged wrongfiil death of their unborn child. Plaintiffs damages for medical negligence
and wrongful death are interrelated given that the result of the alleged medical negligence was
the death of Plaintiff s unborn child. Plaintiffs gave an exhaustive description of those claims in
their Addendum.
Given the level of detail provided in Plaintiffs' Addendum and the interrelated nature of
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the damages, the court finds no prejudice to the governmentfromPlaintiffs' failure to list
damages in the personal injury category. The court concludes that Plaintiffs' Standard Form 95
and their attached Addendum adequately notified Defendant that Plaintiffs were bringing a
medical negligence claim with associated damages, not just a wrongful death claim.
Accordingly, the courtfindsno jurisdictional bar to Plaintiff pursuing damages for Plaintiffs'
mental distress associated with their medical negligence claim.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above reasoning, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Question of Law to the Utah
Supreme Court is GRANTED. This court requests the Utah Supreme Court to answer the
following certified question, if it elects to do so*. Does Utah's wrongful death statute allow an
action for the wrongful death of an unborn child?
As a result of the court's determination to certify this question to the Utah Supreme
Court, the court stays its ruling on the wrongful death damages issue raised in Defendant's
Motion in Limine to Exclude From Trial All* Evidence Regarding Plaintiffs Miguel Carranza and
Amelia Sanchez's Damages for Wrongful Death until the Utah Supreme Court rules on the
certification order. The court also strikes the pending May 27,2009 trial date. The court will
reset the trial date accordingly.
Pursuant to Rule 41(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Clerk of Court shall
transmit a copy of this certification order, under this court's official seal, to the Utah Supreme
Court. The Clerk of Court shall also certify a copy of any portion of the record in this case as
may be directed by the Utah Supreme Court.
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DATED this 14th day of May, 2009.

DALE A. KIMBALL
United States District Judge
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infant, insane, or incompetent person in the action or proceeding, notwithstanding
he may have a general gnardian and may have appeared by him. [C L § 3 L74.
Cal. C. Civ. P. i 372.

Guardian to appear for ward, U 4009, 4046.

2908. Guardian ad litem, how appointed. When a guardian ad
litem is appointed by a court, or the judge thereof, he must be appointed as
follows:
1. When the infant is plaintiff, upon the application of the infant, if he be
of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application of a
relative or friend of the infant.
2. When the infant is defendant, upon the application of the infant, if he
be of the age of fourteen years and apply within twenty days after the service of
the summons, or if under that age or if he neglect so to apply, then upon the
application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any other party to the action.
3. When an infant defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable person to
be guardian ad litem for such infant defendant, unless the defendant or someone in
his behalf, within twenty days after service of notice of such motion shall procure
to ba appointed a guardian for such infant. Service of such notice may be caade
upon the general or testamentary guardian of such defendant, if he have one in
this state; if not, such notice, together with the summons in the action, shall be
served in the manner provided by law for publication of summons upon such
infant if over fourteen years of age, or, if under fourteen years of age, by such
service on the person with whom such infant resides. The guardian ad litem for
such non-resident infant defendant shall have twenty days after his appointment
in which to plead to the action.
4. When an insane or incompetent person is a party tp an action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or incompetent
person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding. [C. L. § 3175*.
CalCCiT. P..? 373* Wisconsin 2 26H»

2909. Unmarried female m a y sue for seduction. An unmarried
female, under twenty years of age at the time of her seduction, may prosecute,
as plaintiff/an action therefor, and may recover therein such damages, pecuniary
or exemplary, as are assessed in her favor. [C L. § 3176.
Cal. C Civ. P. } 374*.

Limitation of action, one year, J 2879.

2910. Id. W h e n parent or guardian m a y sue. A father, or in case
of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may prosecute as plaintiff for
the seduction of the daughter, who, at the time of her seduction, is under the age
of majority; and the gnardian, for the seduction of the ward, who, at the time of
her seduction, is under the age of majority, though the daughter or the ward be
not living with or in the service of the plaintiff at the time of the seduction, or
afterwards, and there be no loss of service. [C. L. § 3177.
Grf. a dr. P. i 375*

2911. Parent may sue for iiyury or death of minor child. A
father, or in case of his death or desertion of his family, the mother, may maintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child; and a gnardian, for the
injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death is caused by the wrongful
act or neglect of another. Such action may be maintained against the person
<*asiug the injury or death, or if such person be employed by another person
*ho is reponsible for his conduct, also against such other person. [0. L. § 3178.
C*l a Civ. P. i 376.

2012. Heirs f etc., m a y sue for death of adult. Damages for death
Unlimited. When the death of a person not a minor is caused by the wrongful
set or neglect of another, his heirs or personal representatives may maintain an
action for damages against the person causing the death, or, if such person be
^ployed by another person who is responsible for his conduct, then also against
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ACTIONS—BIGHT TO SUB AND BE SUED
urinal or civil action for seduction, 85
lu B. 123.

78-11-6

Right of seduced female to maintain
action for seduction, 121 A. L. R. 1487.

78-11-5, When parent or guardian may sue.—A parent or guardian may
osecute as plaintiff an action for the seduction of a child who, at the
le of seduction, is under the age of majority, though the child or the
,rd is not living with or in the service of the plaintiff at the time of
5 seduction or afterwards and there is no loss of service.
Bttstory: X* 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; 0. 1943,
M^, 104-11-5; Is. 1977, ch. 141, §2.
antler's Notes*
?hU section is identical to former seci 104-3-9 (Code 1943) which was reJed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3.
The 1977 amendment rewrote this seca to permit parent of either sex to
i for seduction of a child of either aexr
tor to amendment, this section read: "A
her, or, in case of his death or desern of hi* family, the mother, may prose.6 aa plaintiff an action for the seduc-

tion of a daughter who, at the time of her
seduction, is under the age of majority,
and a guardian, for the seduction of his
ward, who, at the time of her seduction, is
under the age of majority, though the
daughter or the ward ia not living with
or in the service of the plaintiff at the
time of the seduction or afterwards and
there is no loss of service."
Collateral References.
Seductiou<$=>ll.
79 CJT.& Seduction § 14,
70 Am. Jur. 2d 53, Seduction § 1 et seq.

78-11-6. Injury or death of child—When parent or guardian may sue.—
:cept as provided in chapter 1, of Title 35, a parent or guardian may
tintain an action for the death or injury of a minor child when such
lury or death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. Any
;h action may be maintained against the person causing the injury or
ath, or, if such person is employed by another person who is responsible
• that person's conduct, also against such other person.
listory: I* 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943;
PP^ 104-11-6; Ik 1977, ch. 141, § 3.

who is responsible for his conduct, also
against such other person."

npiler's Kotea.
Phis section is identical to former secft 104-3-10 (Code 1943) which was relied by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3 except
the substitution of the reference to
le 35 of the 1953 Code for a reference
ritle 42 of the 1943 Code.
Hie 1977 amendment rewrote this seca to permit suit by either parent. Prior
amendment, this section read: "Exeept
provided in chapter 1, of Title 35, a
•her, or in case of his death or desertion
his family, the mother, may maintain
action for the death or injury of a
(tor child when such injury or death is
wed by the wrongful act or neglect of
>ther; and a guardian may maintain an
•ion for the injury or death of his ward,
the ward is of lawful age, when such
ury or death is caused by the wrongful
or neglect of another, the action by
' guardian to be prosecuted for the
»efit of the heirs of the ward. Any such
ion may be maintained against the
rsou causing the injury or death, or, if
*h person is employed by another ncrson

Oross-Beferencea.
Comparative negligence, 78-27-37 et seq.
Death of person entitled to sue, effect
on statute of limitations, 78-12-37, 78-12-38.
Evidence required for recovery, 78-11-12,
78-11-13.
Bight to recover damages for death
generally, Const Art XVI, § 5Statute of limitations, wrongful death,
78-12-28.
Survival of cause of action, 78-11-12,
78-11-13.
Voluntary payment of claim not an admission of liability, 78-27-29 et seq.
Conflict of laws.
In action brought in Colorado by father
to recover for alleged wrongful death of
son while a passenger on defendant's bus,
as a result of accident which occurred in
Utah, father's right to recover and amount
of recovery wa8 governed by constitutional and statutory provisions of Utah.
Stoltz v. Burlington Transp. Co., 178 F.
2d 514.
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,ONG TITLE
General Description:
This bill provides that wrongful death claims o f children will be handled in the same
xianner as the wrongful death claims of adults.
Highlighted Provisions:
This bill:
• provides that wrongfiil death claims o f children will be handled in the same manner
as the wrongful death claims of adults.
M o n i e s Appropriated in this Bill:
None
O t h e r Special Clauses:
Npne
Utah C o d e Sections Affected:
AMENDS:
7 8 B - 3 - 1 0 3 , as renumbered and amended by Laws of Utah 2 0 0 8 , Chapter 3
7 8 B - 3 - 1 0 6 , as renumbered and amended by Laws o f Utah 2 0 0 8 , Chapter 3
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section 7 8 B - 3 - 1 0 2 is amended to read:
7 8 B - 3 - 1 0 2 . Injury of a child - Suit b y p a r e n t o r guardian.
(1) Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2 , Workers 1 Compensation Act, a parent
or guardian may bring an action for the [death or] injury of a minor child when the injury [or
death] is caused by the wrongful act or neglect o f another.
(2) A civil action may be maintained against theperson causing the injury [oi death]
or, if the person is employed by another person w h o is responsible for that person's conduct,
also against the employer.
(3) If a parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal guardian is the alleged defendant
in an action for the [death ut] injury o f a child, a guardian adT litem may be appointed for the
injured child [oi a child other than die deceased child] according to the procedures outlined in
Section 78A-2-227
Section 2 . Section 7 8 B - 3 - 1 0 6 is amended to read:
7 8 B - 3 - 1 0 6 . Death o f a person ~- Suit b y heir o r p e r s o n a l representative,
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(1) Except as provided in Title 34A, Chapter 2, Woricers* Compensation Act, when the
death of a person [who is nut a minor] is caused by the wrongfiil act or neglect of another, his
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heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action for
damages against the person causing the death, or, if the person is employed by another person
who is responsible for his conduct, then against the other person

H.B.329
44
45
46
47
48

LAWS OF UTAH -2009

CH.79

(2) If the adult person has a guardian at the time of his death, only one action may be
maintained for the person's injury or death.
(3) The action may be brought by either the personal representatives of the adult
deceased person, for the benefit of the person's heirs, or by the guardian for the benefit of the
heirs, as defined in Section 78B-3-1 OS.

AQ1

